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EQUITY OR INEQUALITY?: DEFINING BAD
FAITH IN INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
"[W]hen we consider the rapid development of
corporations as instrumentalities of the commercial and
business world in the lastfew years, with the corresponding
necessity of adapting legal principles to new and vary
exigencies of this business, it is no solid objection to such a
principle that it is modern, for the occasionfor it could not
sooner have arisen. "I

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
entered a judgment dismissing a creditor's involuntary bankruptcy petition
for bad faith, notwithstanding the creditor's compliance with the standing
requirements. 2 This new and impactful decision puts creditors in a hostile
situation, as the already stringent requirements to filing an involuntary
bankruptcy petition have been heightened.3 This holding does not come as
a surprise, however.' The Third Circuit's decision follows a trend of
decisions over the past few decades that have scrutinized creditors' attempts
to pull debtors into court to collect on their debts.'
The bankruptcy laws established in the United States have provided
an outlet for creditors to seek repayment on the debts of unwilling debtors.'
Unlike the traditional voluntary bankruptcy route, where a debtor seeks to

' Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610,620 (1873) (identifying importance of legal reform).
See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding
involuntary bankruptcy petition dismissible at inception for bad faith).
3 See Barry M. Klayman, A CautionaryTale for Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitioners,LAW360
(Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/718749/a-cautionary-tale-for-involuntarybankruptcy-petitioners (noting Third Circuit ruling places another hurdle in front of creditors filing
involuntary petitions).
4 See Norman N. Kinel, When Not to FileAn Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition, LAw360 (Feb.
22, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/761250/when-not-to-file-an-involuntary-bankruptcypetition (outlining potential consequences in filing involuntary bankruptcy petition).
s See Scott K. Brown, Rolling in the Involuntary, AM. BANKR. INST. J. (Nov. 2012),
https://www.1rrc.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Rolling%20in%20the%20Ilnvoluntary,%20by/2
OScott%20Brown.pdf (noting requirements to proceed safely with involuntary bankruptcy
petition).
6 See Charles J. Tabb, The History ofthe Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 5, 16 (1995) (noting bankruptcy creditor remedy in early American history); Vern
A. Countryman, A History ofAmerican BankruptcyLaw, 81 COM. L. J. 226,228 (1976) (exhibiting
early English model of bankruptcy focused on involuntary proceedings).
2
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enter resolution of his debt situation with his creditors, the involuntary
petition allows a creditor to force a debtor into bankruptcy, as long as the
7
creditor follows strict guidelines set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. Even
with the standing to bring a case, courts have probed creditors' attempts to
file involuntary petitions, often dismissing the claims because the creditors
allegedly acted in bad faith.' These dismissals have been largely based on
the Circuit Courts' varying interpretations of bad faith. 9
Recent decisions have influenced bankruptcy laws to support the
notion that involuntary bankruptcy petitions are too harsh a burden on
debtors." As a result, courts have begun imposing harsh sanctions on
1
attorneys and parties that allegedly file involuntary petitions in bad faith."
The Bankruptcy Code provides for sanctions and punitive damages to be
imposed with respect to bad faith bankruptcies under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i), but
the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a basis for

See Nicholas Gebelt, Involuntary Bankruptcy: What Is It, and Why Would Anyone File One?
2012),
13.
(Jan.
BLOG
LAW
BANKR.
CAL.
S.
2
2
http://www.southerncalifoniabankruptcylawblog.com/ 01 /01/13/involuntary-bankruptcy-whatis-it-and-why-would-anyone-file-one/ (explaining purpose of involuntary bankruptcy).
See James H. Haithcock III & Robert C. Goodrich Jr., Bad News, Will Travel Fast: Third
Circuit Imposes "Good Faith" Condition on Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitioners, 2015 NO. 12
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER NEWSLETTER 1 (2015) (describing recent decision by Third Circuit
imposing good faith filing requirement). "[A]s courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are equipped
with the doctrine of good faith so that they can patrol the border between good and bad-faith
filings." Id; see also In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 334 (3d Cir. 2015)
(holding bad faith filing provides basis for dismissing involuntary suit even when statutory criteria
met).
I See Collier on Bankruptcy ¶303.16 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Somme reds., 16th ed. 2017)
LEXIS NEXIS (noting varying interpretations of bad faith courts employ in analysis). It seems that
the purpose of these tests is to alert creditors to not push too hard on debtors. Id; see also Isabella
C. Lacayo, Note, After the Dismissal of an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition: Attorney 's Fees
Awards to Alleged Debtors, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1949, 1954 (2006) (stating purpose of
bankruptcy skewed towards debtor's recovery). "The goal of bankruptcy law is skewed towards
providing debtors rather than creditors with remedies; therefore, the Code constructs many barriers
to efforts by creditors to obtain involuntary relief." Id. at 1954.
'o See Timothy Bow, Article, Student Gallery, Involuntary Petitions: Bad-FaithMotives and
High Risks, 31-7 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 52, 55 (2012) (noting involuntary petitions frequently used
litigation tactic). "Involuntary petitions have frequently been used as a litigation tactic, a means to
harass a debtor, a substitute for ordinary collection procedures or a means to wrest corporate control
from a company's owners." Id. at 52.
11 See id. at 53 (noting status of courts dealing with bad faith involuntary bankruptcies). "If
the bankruptcy court finds that the involuntary petition was motivated by or is a product of bad
faith, in addition to attorney's fees and costs, it may award-against any petitioner-damages
proximately caused by such filing along with any punitive damages due to the debtor." Id. Among
the cruel sanctions includes compensatory and punitive damages. See In re John Richards Home
Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 312 B.R. 849, 866 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004) (noting Congress intended to deter
filing involuntary petitions by inserting provision into Bankruptcy Code).
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determining how those sanctions are assessed.12 Instead, courts have
developed their own interpretations of section 303(i) through the creation of
several bad faith tests to measure the actions of creditors in filing involuntary
petitions, which have been nothing shy of relentless.13 The imposition of
these sanctions imposed by the bad faith tests are contrary to the forum that
once endorsed a creditor-friendly system and have ultimately turned the
tables on creditors' rights to remedy in the sphere of bankruptcy law.14
This article argues that a majority of the standards implemented in
the Circuit Courts to evaluate whether an involuntary bankruptcy was filed
in bad faith are improper in light of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Code and the equitable nature of Bankruptcy." The article begins with a
background on the history of bankruptcy in the United States.' 6 It will
review how involuntary bankruptcy has served as a remedy for creditors in
obtaining judgments on debtors' outstanding debts, as well as an introduction
to bad faith in the context of § 303 involuntary petitions." The article will
then discuss how the courts have come to shape the determination of bad
faith in the context of creditors filing for involuntary bankruptcy.'s Next, an
analysis of the inherent risks involved in filing an involuntary bankruptcy
under each test follows.1 9 The article concludes that the totality of the
circumstances test is the appropriate standard for determining bad faith in
involuntary proceedings based on its equitable roots.2 0 However, this article
ultimately serves as a guide for navigating the consequences of filing an
12 See In re Bayshore Wire Products Corp., 209 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting courts
take multiple approaches in determining bad faith because no set definition); see also In re
Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 619 (B.A.P. 91 Cir. 1986) (asserting "Bankruptcy Code does not
define bad faith for purpose of awarding damages").
13 See e.g., In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 179 n.14 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (providing improper
use test); In re Bayshore, 209 F.3d at 107 (defining improper purpose test); In re Wavelength, 61
B.R. at 620 (laying out objective test); In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 338
(providing totality of the circumstances test).
14 See Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy For American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 81, 83-84 (2012) (stating several functions bankruptcy serves, including interests of
creditors); see also Tabb, supra note 6, at 51 (noting early bankruptcy laws creditors remedy). "The
1800 Act was very similar to the 1732 English act, and also had many of the features of the
Pennsylvania statute. It was purely a creditor's remedy. Only creditors, upon proof of the debtor's
commission of an act of bankruptcy. . . ." Id. at 14; Bow, supra note 10, at 52 (explaining
involuntary bankruptcy sometimes litigation tactic to gain advantage). Involuntary petitions have
been used to gain an advantage over debtors when other collection procedures can be sought. Id.
15 See Infra, Part V.
6 See Infra, Part I.
17 See Infra, Parts 11-111.
See Infra, Part IV.
See Infra, PartV.
20 See Infra, Part V.
1
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involuntary petition under each test, as well as the future of bankruptcy
litigation.2 1
I.

HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA

Bankruptcy laws in colonial America were initially adopted from
England's early bankruptcy laws, which encompassed merciless punishment
for bankrupt debtors, permitting imprisonment for unpaid debts, the cutting
of ligaments for fraudulent debtors, and in some circumstances death. 22 The
American laws did not impose these severe punishments as a consequence
of insolvency, but rather served as a creditor's remedy, as cases were limited
solely to the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. 23 Because the government
viewed the indebted as delinquent and unsavory, no remedies were available
to protect them from creditors, which upset state legislators who could not
relieve debtors without federal bankruptcy legislation. 24 Nevertheless, in the
early nineteenth century, involuntary proceedings were limited primarily to
the affairs arising from commerce, not the matters of individuals.25
In the eighteenth century, the notion that bankruptcy should become
a uniform law was predicated on the fact that bankruptcy was a creditor's
The framers of the Constitution supported government
remedy. 26
interjection in the affairs of bankruptcy in order to create a safeguard on
creditors' ability to collect on their debts.27 This principle was elicited in
21 See Infra, Part VI.
22 See Countryman, supra note 6, at 233 (describing system of early English bankruptcy law
and imposition of harsh punishments on fraudulent debtors); see also, Jay Cohen, The History of
Imprisonmentfor Debt and its Relation to the Development ofDischargein Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL
HIST. 153, 171 (1982) (examining history of imprisonment for debt and origins of bankruptcy in
sixteenth century).
23 See Countryman, supra note 6, at 228 (outlining history and model for bankruptcy in United
States). "It was confined to merchants and provided for involuntary proceedings only on a
creditors' petition filed in federal district court and alleging an act of bankruptcy." Id In this time
period, bankruptcy was not limited to debt, rather it also included concealing oneself from creditors,
disposing of property in an attempt to avoid payment, and defrauding creditors. Id.
24 See, Jeff Ferriell & Edward J. Janger, UnderstandingBankruptcy, 135-36 (LEXIS NEXIS
2007) (2nd ed.) (outlining foundation of American bankruptcy law in history).
25 See source cited infra note 50, at 16 (noting first bankruptcy laws applied to commercial
parties, including merchants, bankers, and brokers).
26 See Ferriell & Janger, supra note 24, at 135 (noting early bankruptcy laws utilized to protect
creditors). "[Bankruptcy laws were] placed there, at least in part, at the behest of bankers concerned
about their ability to collect debts in local courts." Id.
27 See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Creditors' Remedies & Debtor's Protection 1-7 (WEST
PUBLISHING CO.) (4th ed. 1987) (noting bankruptcy primarily creditor's remedy). "Perhaps the
most important and earliest innovation was the extension of the creditors' reach to the debtor's
entire interest in land." Id. at 7.
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diplomat, James Madison's Federalist No. 42: "The power of establishing
uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of
commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different Sates, that the expediency of
it seems not likely to be drawn into question." 28 Prior to the first federal
bankruptcy law, states had built comprehensive insolvency laws in order to
combat this concern; these laws governed the matters of debtors and
creditors, but they did not provide for an easy method of apprehending a
fraudulent debtor's repayment.2 9 In fact, debt obligations in colonial
America were difficult to collect on, as a majority of debts consisted of
personal loans or mortgages, where individuals would pledge their property
as collateral; and because debt collection varied from state to state, the lack
of uniformity among jurisdictions ultimately placed restraints on collection
remedies.30
After years of inconsistency, Congress finally utilized their power to
create a law on the subject of bankruptcies in 1800.31 This law was not
significant, other than the fact that it was quickly repealed, based on debtor
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) (discussing classes of powers lodged into
government, including regulation of commerce); see also Wasson & Thornhill, The Bankruptcy
Clause in the FederalistPapers,BANKR. BLOG (Sept. 28, 2012), https://wassonthornhill.com/thebankruptcy-clause-in-the-federalist-papers/ (attempting to determine intent of Madison, including
subject of bankruptcy in Federalist Papers). "Madison, at least, focused on how a uniform national
bankruptcy law would help creditors by preventing debtors from hiding themselves or their assets
in other states. This simply reflects the pro-creditor attitude of bankruptcy law during this period."
Id; F. Regis Noel, A History of the Bankruptcy Law, 5-6 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003)
(discussing interrelation between concept of bankruptcy and its impact on United States
Constitution).
29 See Peter J. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for
Debt, and Bankruptcy 1607-1900, 3-6 (BEARDBOOKS) (1999) (discussing issues and trends
revolving around bankruptcy in colonial America). Coleman writes:
[I]t is an historical fact, that the early English statutes of bankruptcy did not provide for
the discharge either of the debtor or of the person. Discharge is not mentioned, nor in
any way provided for, until the 4' or 5 ' of Anne; that is, after the system of bankruptcy
had been established almost two centuries.
Id.; see also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 158-59 (1819) (discussing earlyera collection remedies and history of bankruptcy law).
30 See Coleman, supra note 29, at 3-4 (noting creditor difficulty in obtaining payment from
debtors due to lack of uniformity); see also Cara O'Neill, Your Home in Bankruptcy: The
Homestead Exemption, ALLLAW, http://www.alllaw.com/articles/noloIbankruptcy/homesteadexemption.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2016) (explaining homestead exemption pertaining to
individuals filing for bankruptcy). The homestead exemption simply determines the amount the
creditor will get in a bankruptcy proceeding, based on the dollar amount that may be exempted
pursuant to state law. Id.
31 See Charles J. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution ofthe Bankruptcy Discharge,65 AM. BANKR.
L. J. 325, 343 (1991) (tracing development of bankruptcy laws in America).

2017-18]

EQUITY OR INEQUALITY?

169

and creditor concerns.32 In thel820s, legislators attempted to push for the
creation of another bankruptcy law stemming from economic concerns, as
farmers and mechanics were rendered insolvent in the midst of unstable
commodity prices.
However, these efforts were strongly opposed by
southerners who believed that bankruptcy was unconstitutional. 34 Finally, at
the brink of economic turmoil, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was eventually
passed.35
While the bankruptcy laws in the eighteenth century served to
protect creditors from debtors escaping liability, many grew wary of the
harsh consequences it imposed on commerce.36 As a means of relegating the
issue, legislative reform provided more protection for debtors-both
individually and in commerce with the creation of the Bankruptcy Act of
184 13 For the first time, bankruptcy laws provided remedies for debtors to
relieve themselves through a voluntary petition.38 Despite the significance
of this Act at the time, it quickly turned sour after "thousands of debtors were
discharged, minimal dividends were paid to creditors, and administrative
fees [remained] high."39
With the creation of a voluntary remedy available to debtors in the
1841 Act, the future of bankruptcy quickly changed from a creditor's
remedy, to a debtor's solution to discharge.4 0 Several amendments followed
32 See Countryman, supra note 6, at 228 (describing reasons for dissatisfaction with
Bankruptcy Act of 1800). "Reasons for dissatisfaction with the measure were various: the difficulty
of travel to federal courts, the extension of federal powers . . . the fact that dividends to creditors
were very small because most debtors were already in jail . . . ." Id.
3 See Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History, 26-27 (HARVARD UNIV.
PRESS) (1935) (explaining negative effects of not having uniform bankruptcy law in place).
34 See Tabb, supra note 6, at 51 (noting dissent from southerners in movement to create
uniform bankruptcy law).
Throughout the 1820s attempts were made to pass a bill permitting voluntary bankruptcy
for the direct relief of debtors, merchant and non-merchant alike. Yet throughout that
period all such efforts were rebuffed by an alliance of southerners, who opposed any
federal bankruptcy bill, and others who believed that voluntary bankruptcy was
unconstitutional.
Id at 16 (citations omitted).
35 See id (discussing history of 1841 Bankruptcy Act).
36 See id at 28 (noting uncertainty in involuntary bankruptcy and need for voluntary process
for debtors to relieve debts).
3 See Tabb, supra note 31, at 17 (describing creation of bankruptcy act).
38 See Warren, supra note 33, at 229 (noting creation of voluntary petition).
39 See Tabb, supra note 31, at 19 (describing failure of 1841 Act).
40 See id. (explaining advantages of voluntary proceedings to debtor and restraints imposed
upon creditors). "An important benefit of the Act to debtors, however was that it allowed debtors
to elect the benefit of generous state exemption laws as an alternative to the federal scheme . . the
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the 1841 Act, including the 1867 Act that dropped the restriction on
involuntary bankruptcy to merchants, and opened the door to the potential
for involuntary petitions to be pursued against individuals. 4' Further
innovations in 1874 integrated composition agreements for debtors and in
1898, the United States held onto the longest piece of bankruptcy legislation
until the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978.42
By 1973, concerns arose amongst creditors and bankruptcy scholars
regarding the set up of the bankruptcy laws initiated in 1898.43 The 1898
Act called for specific acts of bankruptcy, as opposed to the debtor's failure
to pay on their debts, as means of initiating the involuntary bankruptcy
petition." These acts were generally hard to prove and placed restraints on
some creditors' ability to collect.45 The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
utilization of state exemption laws in federal bankruptcy cases has continued to the present." Id. at
20 (citation omitted).
41 See Countryman, supra note 6, at 228 (noting legislative changes in bankruptcy law
throughout eighteenth century).
42 See Tabb, supra note 33, at 21 (describing innovations as bankruptcy law flourished). "The
composition agreement, the forerunner of modem reorganization provisions, allowed the debtor to
propose payment of a certain percentage of his debts over time in full discharge of those debts,
while also keeping his property." Id.
43 See Susan Block-Lieb, Why CreditorsFile So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the
Number is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 809-11(1991) (noting changes to standards
for commencement of involuntary petition and difficulties in proving debtor insolvency). "If [a]
debtor contested the [involuntary] filing, petitioning creditors were required to show that the debtor
had committed an act of bankruptcy. . . ." Id. at 809.
4 See id. at 807-10 (identifying six required acts of bankruptcy). The requirements include:
The 1898 Act identified six different "acts of bankruptcy": (a) fraudulent transfers under
Section 67 or 70 of the Act (concerning avoidance of certain statutory liens and other
fraudulent transfers); (b) preferential transfers under Section 60a of the Act; (c) the
failure to vacate a judicial lien in a timely manner, within the later of 30 days after
imposition of the lien or 5 days before a scheduled judicial sale, if the debtor was
insolvent during this period; (d) making a state law assignment for the benefit of
creditors; (e) the appointment under state law of a receiver of property when the debtor
was insolvent or unable to pay its debts; and (f) the admission in writing of an inability
to pay debts and a willingness to be adjudicated bankrupt.
Id. at 809-10. See also Scott E. Blakely, A Proper Purposefor Commencing an Involuntary
Bankruptcy Petition:Preservinga PreferenceAction, BLAKELEY, LLP (May 2, 2011, 10:25 PM),
http://www.blakeleyllp.com/content/2011/05/02/a-proper-purpose-for-commencing-aninvoluntary-bankruptcy-petition-preserving-a-preference-action/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018)
(noting Congress' liberalization of standards pertaining to "acts of bankruptcy").
45 See Block-Lieb, supra note 43, at 812-14 (noting ambiguity in 1898 Bankruptcy Act).
"Because of these ambiguities, trials on contested involuntary petitions often dragged on for long
periods of time at considerable expense to petitioning creditors and others." Id. at 813. "Not only
was insolvency extremely difficult to prove, but the determinations as to whether the debtor had
committed an act of bankruptcy and whether it was insolvent were questions of fact on which the
debtor was entitled to ajury trial." Id. at 813.
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proposed in 1973 "that a standard permitting the institution of an involuntary
case when a debtor was unable to pay its current obligations be substituted
for the 'acts of bankruptcy."'4 6 The Commission reasoned that the stake
creditors had in collecting on their debts was apparent and only aggressive
creditors were able to take advantage of the laws that were in place.47 These
changes marked the inception of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.48
II.

INVOLUNTARY PETITIONS

The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was a turning point in federal
bankruptcy law, as it replaced the law that had been in effect since 1898 and
created the Bankruptcy Code, which continues to regulate bankruptcy law in
the United States today.49 This change also arrived as, arguably, the most
debtor-friendly bankruptcy law."o When the 1978 law was enacted,
Congress inserted § 303 into the Bankruptcy Code which provided the
foundation for filing involuntary cases while also laying out the strict
requirements to filing a petition." This change ultimately made it harder for
46 See id. at 815 (noting standards Commission on Bankruptcy Laws attempted
to adopt in
furtherance of new amendments). "Others more broadly proposed improvements to the definition
of the term insolvent." Id.
47 See id. (noting shifting purpose of early bankruptcy laws).
48 See id. at 817-18 (noting Congress' reactions to suggestions and enactment of 1978 Act).
"Although Congress did not incorporate all of the Commission's suggestions on this topic when it
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it removed the 'acts of bankruptcy' as the standard of
commencement of an involuntary case.. . ." Id
49 See id. at 32 (tracing creation of Bankruptcy Code).
so See Block-Lieb, supra note 43, at 32 (noting inception of Bankruptcy Code arguably most
debtor-friendly); see also Margaret Howard, Cases and Materials on Bankruptcy (WEST
PUBLISHING CO.) (5th ed. 2011) (noting bankruptcy law device for relief of overburdened
debtors). Cf Susan Block-Lieb, supra note 43, at 835 (recognizing Congress's intent to provide
protection for creditors by abolishing acts of bankruptcy).

First, it recognized that petitioning creditors had difficulty establishing their debtor's
insolvency, which often was an element under the "acts of bankruptcy." More than just
to simplify proof of the standard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case,
however, Congress also recognized that ... [they should] encourage and facilitate earlier
resort to [bankruptcy] relief and, . . . to increase dividends to creditors.
Id. at 835-36.
51 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2018) (laying statutory framework for filing involuntary petition).
Scott E. Blakely, A Proper Purpose for Commencing an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition:
Preserving
a
Preference
Action,
BLAKELEY,
LLP,
http://www.blakeleyllp.com/content/2011/05/02/a-proper-purpose-for-commencing-aninvoluntary-bankruptcy-petition-preserving-a-preference-action/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2018)
(noting purpose of involuntary bankruptcy since its inception as equitable remedy). "The historic
purpose of involuntary bankruptcy is to provide vendors with a means of assuring equal distribution
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creditors to be able to reach debtors in collecting on unpaid debts even
without the requirement of specific acts of bankruptcy, as was the case in
earlier versions of the legislation.5 2
The restraints imposed on creditors are memorialized in 11 U.S.C. §
this section, creditors are granted the opportunity to file an
Under
303."
involuntary petition under either Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to
compel a debtor into court to pay on its debts. 54 The statute requires that the
creditor file an involuntary petition that must then be served upon the
involuntary debtor." Once the debtor receives the petition, they will have
an opportunity to defend against the action and argue that the creditor did
not meet the specific requirements outlined in § 303.56 Those requirements

of the debtor's assets. In addition to assuring an orderly liquidation and equal distribution of assets,
an involuntary proceeding may benefit vendors . . . to recapture fraudulent conveyances . . . ." Id.
52 See Tabb, supra note 31, at 32 (noting changes pertaining to debtors in 1978 reform act);
see also Norman N. Kinel, When Not to File An Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition, LAW360 (Feb.
22, 2016, 11:14 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/761250/when-not-to-file-an-involuntarybankruptcy-petition (discussing harsh ruling against law firm attempting to force debtor into
bankruptcy). "'The bankruptcy court is not a collection agency,' bankruptcy is not a judgment
enforcement device. Bankruptcy is a collective remedy, with the original purpose-which
continues to this day-to address the needs and concerns of creditors with competing demands to
debtors' limited assets . . . ." Id. (quoting In re Matthew M. Murray, Case No. 14-10271 (Banker.
S.D.N.Y. 2016)).
53 See Bob Eisenbach, ForcedInto Bankruptcy: The Involuntary Bankruptcy Process, IN THE
(RED):

THE

BUSINESS

BANKRUPTCY

BLOG

(May

24,

2012),

http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2012/05/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/forced-intobankruptcy-the-involuntary-bankruptcy-process/ (articulating varying requirements for creditors to
pursue the involuntary petition); see also Isabella C. Lacayo, Note, After the Dismissal of an
Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition: Attorney's Fees Awards to Alleged Debtors, 27 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1949, 1954 (2006) (outlining strict procedural requirements to filing involuntary petition).
54 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2018) (outlining requirements of filing involuntary bankruptcy
petition); see also Joe Lee, Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition Chapter 13: Code §§ 301-303
(July 2010) (discussing fact involuntary bankruptcy not achieved under Chapter XIII due to lack of
willingness). Involuntary cases are also prohibited against farmers and municipalities because they
make bad policies. Id. Moreover, an involuntary petition imposed against a municipality would
conflict with the Tenth Amendment. Id; Diane Davis, Bad Faith Dooms Involuntary Bankruptcy
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.bna.com/bad-faith-doomsPetition, BLOOMBERG BNA
n57982062791/ (noting most courts agree involuntary bankruptcies require good faith filing).
5s See J. Kate Stickles & Patrick J. Reilley, The Nuts & Bolts ofInvoluntary Bankruptcy, 27JUN AM. BAMKR. INST. J. 30 (2008) (noting petition commences once filed and served upon
debtor).
56 See id. at 30 (outlining debtor's response to involuntary petition). "After an involuntary
petition has been filed, the involuntary debtor has 20 days to file a responsive pleading." Id. Section
303(h) of the Code and Bankruptcy Rule 1013(b) are tantamount, in the sense that they both offer
that the court must enter an order of relief when no response is rendered. Id. Stickles and Reilley
write, "§303(h) provides that if the involuntary petition 'is not timely controverted, the court shall
order relief against the debtor."' Id. Furthermore, Rule 1013(b) requires that "[i]f no pleading or
other defense to the petition is filed within the time provided . .. the court, on the next day, or as
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include: the creditor's ability to file the petition,57 the petitioning creditor
must be a holder of a claim "that is not contingent as to liability or the subject
of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount,"" and the aggregate amount
of claims must total $15, 775.59
Creditors attempting to invoke the benefits of the involuntary
petition must not only meet the stringent statutory requirements prior to
making their case in court, but they must also tread lightly on the feet of the
good faith filing requirement.6 0 Unlike the debtor-friendly voluntary

soon thereafter as practicable, shall enter an order for the relief requested in the petition." Id.
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (outlining when involuntary case may commence). "An involuntary
case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except
a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation, that may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is commenced." Id.; See
Eric J. Taube, Involuntary Bankruptcy: Who May Be a Petitioning Creditor?, 21 HOUS. L. REV.
339, 350 (1984) (Courts recently have allowed holders of "disputed but noncontingent claims to be
counted as involuntary petitioning creditors.").
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2018) (elucidating claim requirements for bringing involuntary
petition against debtor). "An involuntary case may be commenced: ...
(1) by three or more
entities, each of which is either a holder of a claim against such a person that is not contingent as
to liability or amount or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, or an indenture
trustee representing such a holder . . . ." Id. This requirement is in place so that creditors will not
use the Bankruptcy Code to force debtors into court when there may be a question as to the liability
that is owed. Id.; see also Peter Spero, Fraudulent Transfers, Prebankruptcy Planning and
Exemptions § 10:10 (Aug. 2016) (explaining bona fide dispute requirement for filing involuntary
petition). The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee took the view that:
When all the events have occurred which allow a court to adjudicate a claim and
determine whether or not payment should be made, there is no contingency concerning
the claim itself, unless it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that petitioning creditor would
be unable to obtain judgment against debtor upon adjudication of its claim.
In re Taylor & Assocs. L.P., 193 B.R. 465, 475 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (citations omitted); see
also Steven J. Winkelman, Comment, A Dispute Over Bona Fide Disputes in Involuntary
Bankruptcy Proceedings,81 U. CI. L. REv. 1341, 1352-53 (2014) (noting Congress' act in adding
phrase "subject of a bona fide dispute" in § 303).
5 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, 119 Stat. 23, 29-30 (2005) (addressing new standards for voluntary petitions in bankruptcy with
some amendments to § 303); see also Nathan L. Rudy, Note, Robbing Your Rival's Piggybank:
The Third CircuitAffirms Bad Faith Dismissals In Involuntary Bankruptcies After In Re Forever
Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 61 VILL. L. REv. 705, 709 (2016) (eliciting standards required in order
to file involuntary bankruptcy petition).
60 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2018). The prerequisites include: the creditor proving that they
may
petition the debtor into court, determining whether the claim is subject to a bona fide dispute, and
overcoming the burden of showing that the debtor is generally not paying their debts. Id; see also
David S. Kennedy, ET. AL, The Involuntary Bankruptcy Process:A Study ofthe Relevant Statutory
and ProceduralProvisionsand Related Matters, 31U. MEM. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2000) (outlining three
threshold issues arising in commencement of involuntary bankruptcy case); Carolin Corp. v. Miller,
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bankruptcy, the creditors that file involuntary petitions are subject to the
scrutiny of debtors proclaiming that they have filed their petition in bad
faith.61 This characteristic can be explained by the perceived detriment an
involuntary petition may put the debtor into in eyes of the courts, which has
been the consistent view of the judiciary for the past few decades.62
III. BAD FAITH FILINGS
The legislative history of § 303 has not provided context to the courts
in determining whether a claim is, in fact, filed in bad faith.6 3 Rather, the
definition of bad faith is merely grounded in the Bankruptcy and the Circuit
886 F.2d 693, 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding bankruptcy court may dismiss petition for want of good
faith).
61 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2018) (outlining provisions pertaining to bad faith filings in
involuntary bankruptcy petitions). "If [a] court dismisses a petition under this section other than
on consent of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the right to judgment
under this subsection, the court may grant judgment-(1) against the petitions and in favor of the
debtor for (A) costs or (B) a reasonable attorney's fee, or (2) against any petitioner that filed the
petition in bad faith for--{A) any damages proximately caused by such filing or (B) punitive
damages." Id; see also Lubow Machine Co. v. Bayshore Wire Prod. (In re Bayshore Wire Products
Corp.), 209 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating determination of whether bad faith exists question
of fact); Eric Snyder & Eloy Peral, InvoluntaryBankruptcy Petition:A Powerful Toolfor Creditors,
2016)
13,
(June
JOURNAL
LAW
YORK
NEW
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202759586005/Involuntary-Bankruptcy-Petition-APowerful-Tool-for-Creditors?slreturn=20160828161013 (noting involuntary petitions disfavored
by courts). "An involuntary petition filed by a single qualified creditor draws greater scrutiny from
the Bankruptcy Court out of concern that the courts will be used as collection agencies. In those
situations, alleged debtors can rely on additional defenses with varying degrees of success
depending upon the jurisdiction." Id; David A. Samole & Lisa B. Keyfetz, New Law, New Tools
For Creditors:A Fresh Look at the Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition, 16 BUS. L. TODAY 17 (2006)
(highlighting involuntary bankruptcy issues). "Petitioning creditors can expect debtors to argue
that the involuntary filing is improper because a creditor's motive, to limit the debtor's homestead,
is an 'improper use' of the petition that constitutes 'bad faith."' Id at 20.
62 See Howard, supra note 50, at 43 (articulating strict requirements for involuntary petitions
to protect debtors from precipitous filings); see also Brian W. Cashell, et. al., Preliminary
Observations on the Impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of
2005, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Sept. 14, 2007) (elucidating bankruptcy
filings from 2002 to 2007). The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCPA) was created to make the bankruptcy code more favorable for creditors. Id
Nevertheless, the Congressional Research Service's findings concluded that bankruptcy filings
accelerated post-enactment. Id.
63 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5963 (6280-81)
(attempting to lay foundation for bad faith). "Subsection (I) provides for costs, attorney's fees, and
damages in certain circumstances.. . [to] discourage frivolous petitions as well as the more
dangerous spiteful petitions, based on a desire to embarrass the debtor who may be a competitor of
a petitioning creditor or to put the debtor out of business with good cause" Id.; see also In re K.P.
Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 179 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (noting Bankruptcy Code nor legislative history
provides direction for courts in determining bad faith).
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Courts' creation of varying bad faith tests.' At a basic level, most courts
have come to the conclusion that bad faith is prevalent when a creditor
attempts to gain an unfair advantage over a debtor or "[tries] to exert pressure
on the debtor to pay [their] debts." 65 In the context of § 303, creditors act in
bad faith when they file petitions to "collect on a personal debt, to gain an
advantage in pending litigation, or to harass the debtor." Nevertheless, much
of this is ascertained through courts' analysis of bad faith, which is ultimately
out of the scope of the Bankruptcy Code.66
"Whether a party acted in bad faith in filing an involuntary petition
so as to warrant award of costs, fees and damages under 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(i)

6
See In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 617 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (noting no ready definition
of bad faith); see also Lawrence Ponoroff, The Limits of Good FaithAnalyses: Unraveling and
Redefining BadFaith in InvoluntaryBankruptcy Proceedings,71 NEB. L. REv. 209, 212-13 (1992)
(noting purpose of bad faith tests to protect against precipitous filings). "The concern was that
unprincipled creditors would use or threaten use of involuntary bankruptcy, not when its invocation
would increase value for the benefit of the common weal, but to serve a purpose or end unrelated
to (or even at odds with) core bankruptcy policy." Id; see Lawrence Ponoroff, The Limits of Good
FaithAnalyses: Unraveling andRedefining Bad Faith in Involuntary Bankruptcy Proceedings,71
NEB. L. REv. 209, 290 (1992) (explaining bad faith tests vehicle to stop abuses of bankruptcy
process). Ponoroff explains:

Bringing this distinction to bear on the present discussion, it can be said that both
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and the judicially-implied good faith filing requirement are
intended to regulate and control "abuses" of the bankruptcy process. The history of each
is deeply tinged by a profound concern for the damage done to the integrity of judicial
process by the wrongful initiation of bankruptcy cases and associated missuses of the
process.
Id at 290.
65 See Barry M. Klayman, A Cautionary Talefor Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitioners,LAw360
(Oct. 26, 2015, 12:23 PM) http://www.law360.com/articles/718749/a-cautionary-tale-forinvoluntary-bankruptcy-petitioners (arguing Third Circuit's ruling in 2015 case imposes harsh
penalties for involuntary petitioners); see also In re Mylotte, David, & Fitzpatrick, No. 0711861BIF, 2007 WL 2033812 at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 12, 2007) (outlining substantive definition of
bad faith with respect to involuntary bankruptcy). As the court acknowledged,
Bad faith has been defined as The [sic] opposite of "good faith," generally implying or
involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a
neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by
an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive.
[The] [t]erm "bad faith" is not simply bad judgment but rather it implies the conscious
doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from
the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with design or ill will.
Id. at *11 (citing In re Elsinore Shore Associates, 91 B.R. 238 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988)).
66 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (elucidating
what bad faith means in context of § 303 of Bankruptcy Code).
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is a question of fact."6 7 Courts have established several grounds for finding
that a petitioner has acted in bad faith.68 These acts typically comport with
the established bad faith tests and include threats made to other creditors and
the withholding of pertinent facts with respect to the totality of the
circumstances test, as an example. 69 Additional signs of bad faith include
exhibiting personal malice,70 using bankruptcy as vehicle to collect on debt
when other remedies are available,71 and even when a petitioning creditor
knows that they will not meet the stringent requirements set out in 11 U.S.C.
§303, but they file anyway.72
IV. STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING BAD FAITH
Courts have not only struggled to find a precise definition of bad
faith but, rather a more important quandary has been the split among the
67 See Lee, supranote 54, at 13-247 (explaining what constitutes bad faith in filing involuntary
petition in bankruptcy); see also Camelot, Inc. v. Hayden, 30 B.R. 409, 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)
(acknowledging bad faith question of fact); In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 BR. 614, 620 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1986) (noting bad faith question of fact).
68 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-245 to -246 (discussing various ways in which bad faith may
exist in involuntary actions); see also FRIEDLAND, ET AL., Commercial Bankruptcy Litigation §
4:38: Creditors'liability upon dismissal of the involuntary petition (2nd ed. 2016) (noting some
courts may find necessary to inquire on petitioner's potential motives in filing). "[S]ome cases
have begun to expressly acknowledge that, in reaching a decision on the question of bad faith, it is
not only proper but necessary for the court to inquire into and consider both a petitioners conduct
and any possible ulterior motives in filing." Id.
69 See In re John Richards Home Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 439 F.3d 248, 254 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting
threats and withholding of pertinent facts clear examples of bad faith); see also Lee, supranote 54,
at 13-245 (describing bad faith in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings); Brian A. Blum, Bankruptcy
and Debtor/Creditor(ASPEN PUBLISHERS) (4" ed. 2006) (noting involuntary cases concerning
threats and intimidation); 1-8 Lender Liability Law and Litigation § 8.08 (2017) (outlining risks
associated with filing involuntary bankruptcy petition).
70 See Lee, supranote 54, at 13-245 (noting ill will or malice linked to bad faith in involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings); see also In re Johnston Hawks Ltd., 72 B.R. 362, 366 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1987) (acknowledging bad faith exists where ill will, malice, or attempt to embarrass debtor
occurs).
71 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-245 (describing egregious conduct of creditors in seeking
repayment); see also In re Advance Press & Litho, Inc., 46 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984)
(noting bad faith exists when creditors use bankruptcy like debt collection device). "There is a
second line of authority which looks to whether the creditor's actions were an improper use of the
Bankruptcy Code as a substitute for customary collection procedures." Id
72
See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-245 (noting bad faith can exist when creditors attempt to file
without meeting all requirements); see also In re Paczensy, 282 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2002) (acknowledging filing with knowledge creditor cannot meet requirements exhibits bad faith);
In re Meltzer, 516 B.R. 504, 504 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting bad faith can exist when creditor
does not meet all requirements to file); In re Daniel Paczesny, 282 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2002). "Bad faith can be shown by a creditor filing an involuntary petition when it knows that it
cannot meet the requirements of § 303(b)(1). In re Daniel Paczesny, 282 B.R. at 649.
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Circuit courts as to how bad faith should be analyzed in the Bankruptcy
Code. 73 The tests that have been circulating around the circuits include: the
improper use, improper purpose, objective test, and the totality of the
circumstances test. 7 4

The improper use test is an objective measure that examines bad
faith by determining whether a petitioning creditor uses the involuntary
petition as an attempt to gain a disproportionate advantage for itself, as
opposed to seeking to collect debts in another forum.75 This test was applied
in In re Better Care, Ltd. where Akkeron and the accounting firm Evans,
Marshall & Pease, P.C. (EMP) filed an involuntary petition against Better
Care, Ltd.7' The court found that in the midst of filing the petition, the
creditors were colluding against Sarno, a co-owner of Better Care, in order
to gain control of the debtor-entity and direct the flow of collections.77 in
conducting its bad faith analysis, the court found that the petitioning creditors
improperly utilized the involuntary bankruptcy against the debtor in bad faith
because their primary objective was contrary to the principles elicited in the
Bankruptcy Code.
73 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-61 to -69 (elucidating varying tests circulating throughout
circuits).
74 See id. at 13-35 (laying out multiple bad faith tests circulating throughout circuit courts);
see also In re Revely, 148 B.R. 398, 407-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting bad faith found in two
different types of circumstances); Commercial Bankruptcy Litigation § 5.14, 5-82 (1990) ("It
appears that bad faith may be found if either improper motivation or inadequate investigation is
demonstrated."); Isabella C. Lacayo, Note, After the Dismissal of an Involuntary Bankruptcy
Petition:Attorney'sFeesAwards to Alleged Debtors, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 1949, 1978 n.29 (2006)
(outlining tests observed by courts in analyzing bad faith). "Different courts have used different
standards when considering the existence of bad faith for a section 303(i)(2) award ... [S]ome
courts use an objective test which asks whether a reasonable person would have filed. Other courts
look at the creditor's motives and conduct, thus, applying subjective standard. Still other courts
combine both approaches and use a two part test." Id; In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 409
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). Some courts have also examined two other uncommon tests: (1) the nose
test; and (2) the Rule 9011 test. Id. The nose test examines bad faith by employing the mantra: "if
it smells like bad faith, then it's got to be bad faith." Id. On the other hand, the Rule 9011 test is
employed similar to the improper use test, which involves an inquiry into whether motivations
outside of scope of bankruptcy were the reason for the involuntary petition. Id. at 411.
" See In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174, 179 n.14 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (discussing improper
use test in context of bad faith).
76 See In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 405-06 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing background
transactions between petitioning creditors and debtor leading up to filing).
77 See id. at 410-12 (discussing conduct surrounding bad faith filing). The court implicitly
recognized that the goal of bankruptcy is to ensure creditors disputes are handled in an efficient
manner through the priority system and that the petitioning creditors overstepped this boundary in
filing for a non-bankruptcy purpose, thus applying the improper use test as a means for identifying
the bad faith. Id. at 409-412.
78 See id. at 412 (explaining non-bankruptcy objectives petitioning creditors sought to pursue
through involuntary bankruptcy). The Better Care court acknowledged that the petitioning
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On the other end of the spectrum, the improper purpose test is a
subjective measure that examines bad faith by determining whether or not
the involuntary filing was motivated by ill will, malice, or a desire to
embarrass or harass the alleged debtor. 79 In In re Cannon Express Corp.,"o
the court applied this bad faith test to the involuntary petition brought by
Bennett, Kincaid, and Pruss, all of whom were creditors to three separate
trucking contracts. 8 ' The court held that the actions of all three creditors,
namely their failure to investigate the debtor's financial situation and
whether it was paying debts timely, amounted to an improper purpose.8 2
The objective test examines the involuntary filing based on what a
reasonable person would have believed to be the best option for collecting
debt.83 This is the standard employed in In re Wavelength, Inc., a case where
two individuals, Jaffe and Edwards, filed an involuntary petition against
Kronfeld in order to obtain an interest in the debtor's business by pressuring
him to sell his shares to the two petitioning creditors.84 It was evident to the
court that these actions equated bad faith because a reasonable person in the
shoes of Jaffe and Edwards would not have filed an involuntary petition in
order to pressure another person into making a substantial business
decision."
At the crux of these tests is the totality of the circumstances test,
which is a combined test, consisting of both subjective and objective
factors." In employing a totality of the circumstances analysis, courts
consider a myriad of factors, including, whether the petition was meritorious,
the creditors made a reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts prior to filing,
creditors sought to achieve two objectives unrelated to the scope and purpose of bankruptcy: take
control of the stream of payments to creditors; and gain control of Better Care, Ltd. Id.
7 See In re Bayshore, 209 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining improper purpose test);
see also In re Micr Toner Int'l. LLC, Case No.: 2:16-BK-24024-ER, 2017 BANKR. LEXIS 530,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017) (noting sanctions not imposed against already dissolved LLC).
"The Court cannot enter judgment under §303(i) in favor of .. . a dissolved limited liability
company." Id at *22.
so 280 B.R. 450 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002).
" 280 B.R. 450, 455-56 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002) (applying improper purpose test to

petitioning creditor's actions).
82 See id. at 454-55 (noting petitioning creditors failed to review creditor's financial history
and payment status in filing).
83 See In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 619-20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (interpreting bad
faith under the objective test).
84 See id. at 618-19 (noting actions of petitioning creditors constituted bad faith).
85 See id. at 620-21 (acknowledging application of objective test). The Wavelength court
added that the debtor was not insolvent at the time the involuntary petition was filed which stands
as further support the finding of bad faith. Id.
86 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining
totality of circumstances test is compilation of factors).

2017-181]

EQUITY OR INEQUALITY?

179

and whether the petition is begin used as a tactical advantage, among other
considerations.8 7 In the case of In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., the
Third Circuit reviewed the findings of a Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court,
holding that its analysis of the circumstances surrounding the debtors'
conduct in attempting evade arbitration of its claims, among other things,
was sufficient to find a bad faith filing."
V. ADOPTING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
Despite the placement of § 303(i) in the Bankruptcy Code as a
foundation for identifying and evaluating bad faith, many courts remain at a
rudimentary stage of development because they struggle to decide which test
to apply or have only recently adopted a particular test in their respective
jurisdiction. 9 Nevertheless, each bad faith test serves a unique function. 90
While neither Congress nor the Supreme Court supports adopting any of the
furthered tests, litigators and creditors pursuing an involuntary petition
against a debtor should understand the purpose and scope of each test, as
important factors for ultimately determining the success or failure in both
litigation and in the recovery of debts.91
A. Improper Use Test
The core premise of the improper use test is to detect whether an
involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed for reasons other than as a vehicle
for bad faith. 92 In a nutshell, the test aims to examine the objective measures
a creditor took in filing a petition to ensure that there was an appropriate
8

See id. (expanding on totality of circumstances test).

88 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2015) (outlining

lower court's analysis and convergence of varying factors).
89 See In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 620 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (noting Congress
provided no basis for determining bad faith). "The statutory language is that the petitioner must
have 'filed the petition in bad faith' . . . . There is no statutory requirement that the bad faith must
be directed toward anyone in particular." Id.; see also In re Bayshore Wire Products Corp., 209
F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (pointing to courts inconsistent application of bad faith tests).
"Because bad faith is not defined in the bankruptcy code, and because there is no legislative history
addressing the intended meaning of this language, courts have used different approaches to
determine whether a petition was filed in bad faith." Id. (citing General Trading Inc. v. Yale
Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1501 (1lth Cir. 1997)).
90 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-270 (noting varying standards in determining bad faith
includes objective or subjective determinations).
9' See In re Bayshore, 209 F.3d at 105 (noting varying tests circuit courts utilize).
92 See In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 174,179 n.14 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (acknowledging utilizing
improper use test).
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basis for pursuing it in the first place.9' Courts have interpreted the analysis
of this test to be limited to the actions the creditor took to file a petition, but
only from an objective viewpoint.94 In other words, the test strives to
determine whether a filing creditor had knowledge of certain damaging
information and used that information to file an involuntary bankruptcy in
order to gain an edge on the debtor.95
Consider the case of In re Better Care, Ltd.96 where the petitioning
creditors, Akkeron and Evans, Marshall & Pease ("EMP") forced Better
Care and its co-owner into bankruptcy.97 The court in this case found that
both petitioning creditors filed their petition in bad faith under the improper
use test on account of their perceived malevolent intentions.9 8 More
specifically, the court noted that both parties maliciously intended to ensure
that Better Care would go out of business, as a result ofpast disputes between
Akkeron and Sarno, the co-owners. 99 Furthermore, Akkeron's animosity
with Sarno was not the sole motivating factor; rather, EMP encouraged an
involuntary filing because Sarno had recently terminated the accounting
firm's services. 0 0
While the Court pointed out a sufficient basis for dismissing and
finding bad faith under the improper use test, it failed to consider several
other aspects motivating the involuntary petition, many factors of which are
elicited in the totality of the circumstances test.' For one, the Court only
mentions petitioning creditor's conduct, but ignores the factual basis for
which the creditor's petition was actually filed.' 02 Instead of examining both
the subjective and objective factors contributing to the filing, the Better Care
court only took into account the petitioning creditors' perceived intent-such

9 See id. (describing purpose of improper use test); see also Lee, supranote 54, at 13-249-50
(outlining issue of debt collection as motive for filing involuntary petitions).
94 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-270 (highlighting requirements and standards in applying
objective test to set of facts).
95 See id. at 13-247 (mentioning inappropriate uses of involuntary petition). "Involuntary
bankruptcy petition is not substitute for customary collection procedures," and should not be used
as a means to circumvent traditional methods of creditor collections. Id.
96 97 B.R. 405 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
9 97 B.R. 405, 405 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting Bankruptcy Court Judge's findings of fact).
98 See id. at 412 (holding petition filed in bad faith under improper use and improper purpose
test).
9 See id. (explaining facts of case).
1oo See id. (establishing two motivating factors in filing petition).
101 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-245 (outlining several objective and subjective factors used
in determination of bad faith).
102 See In re Better Care, 97 B.R. 405, 412 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1989) (holding bad faith
established when creditors had malicious means to file).
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an incomplete examination render the improper use test an insufficient
means for recognizing bad faith.1 03
B. Improper Purpose Test
Unlike the improper use test, the improper purpose test focuses
primarily on the creditors' subjective intent in filing an involuntary
petition.1" The scope of analysis focuses only on discovering an individual
creditor's knowledge at the time of filing, as well as any motivating factors
that may have existed prior to filing such as, ill will, malice or an intention
to harass the debtor. 105
In In re Cannon Express Corp., the Court held that the creditor's
involuntary petition was filed in bad faith and that their motivations in filing
were contrary to the purpose of bankruptcy." Three petitioners, Bennet,
Kincaid, and Pruss were owed nearly $1 million from a trucking service for
three separate contracts dealing with the recruiting and hiring of international
employees."o 7 The Court noted that when the three determined that Cannon
was not planning on paying its debts to the petitioners, they decided to file a
bankruptcy petition in order to enforce the payment. The Court concluded
that because the petitioners failed to research the debtors financial condition
(to ultimately determine whether or not they were paying their debts as they
0 and
became due), filed in anticipation of Cannon filing bankruptcy,
because the petitioners did not follow the appropriate steps necessary prior

103 See id. (noting improper use test standards employed). The Court noted that in the case at
bar, "it is clear that the improper purpose test was met. There was ample testimony in the record
that petitioners maliciously intended to shut down [the] business." Id.
'10 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-270 (noting improper purpose test focuses on petitioning
creditor's motivation for pursuing involuntary bankruptcy).
See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-245 (signifying bad faith to mean creditor's ill will, malice,
10
and improper use of Bankruptcy Code).
'"
See In re Cannon Express Corp., 280 B.R. 450, 454-55 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002) (noting
parties' only motivation for filing involuntary petition to collect debt).
107 See id. at 453 (reiterating facts of the case).
108 See id. (explaining facts). The petitioning creditors believed that Cannon would enter
voluntary bankruptcy and because they were unsecured creditors, they wanted to ensure that they
would have a standing chance at receiving the debts owed to them, as an involuntary petition would
override priority. Idat 455-57. Nevertheless, the Court disputed this point stating, "[t]here is no
basis in bankruptcy law to support Bennett's theory of priority skipping. If the involuntary petition
was appropriate, any claims Petitioners had against Cannon would be entitled to the priorities
established under § 507." Id. at 455.
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to filing, as a reasonable person would, the petition was deemed filed in bad
faith. 109
The Courts' analysis in finding the petitioner's bad faith in Cannon
under the improper purpose test aligned with the analysis offered in other
courts. 110 The particular matter of inquiry here, however, is with the lack of
objective and subjective factors that are prevalent to be able to identify bad
faith in such a case.111 The Court did examine a fair share of subjective
factors in making their bad faith determination, but limited their objective
factors to that of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the petitioning
creditor. 112 This one objective factor alone is not enough to identify and
evaluate bad faith properly, and will be discussed further in the next section
on the objective test.113
C. Objective Test
The objective test that is employed to identify bad faith is by far the
narrowest in scope. 114 This test attempts to make the difficult decision as to
whether or not a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the creditor
would have filed an involuntary petition."' This test seems to get at the
purpose of the improper use test, where the court will measure the objective
motivations of the petitioning creditor in their bad faith determination." 6

109 See id at 455-57. (elucidating bad faith filing based on failure to act as reasonable creditor
would in situation). The Court also noted that while the petition was filed in bad faith for an
improper purpose, they were unable to find that the petitioners exhibited any ill will, malice, or
harassment, but for the actions of Pruss. Id.
110 See In re Cannon Express Corp., 280 B.R. 450, 453-54 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002) (outlining
court's holding).
' See id. at 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002) (criticizing creditors for failing to look at debtor's
entire picture prior to filing petition). In its decision, the court pointed out that the creditors failed
to look at the debtor's entire financial situation in applying the improper purpose test. Id It seems
that the court's decision to point this out forwards the idea that the improper purpose test does not
do enough to advance the interests of both parties in identifying bad faith. Id.; see also In re Forever
Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (generally holding totality of
circumstance best at finding bad faith because other tests insufficient).
112 See In re Cannon Express Corp., 280 B.R. 450, 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2002) (noting
holding based on objective factor of reasonable person).
113 See In re ForeverGreen Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 336 (noting appropriate objective
analysis requires analyzing multiple factors).
114 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-244 (outlining objective test inquiry into bad faith in filing
involuntary petition).
115 See In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 620 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (noting purpose of
objective test).
116 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-244 (eliciting objective factors including whether petition
justified after inquiry into facts and law).
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The Court in In re Wavelength, Inc., presents a fluid analysis of bad
faith under the objective test.117 In that case, three individuals were the sole
members of the board of directors of Wavelength: Edwards, Kronfeld, and
Jaffe.11 s In 1984, Wavelength elected Ron Goldberg to serve as the President
and Chief Executive Officer of the corporation." 9 Subsequently, Goldberg
removed Kronfeld from the company despite the fact that he had a five-year
employment contract with Wavelength.120
Following Kronfeld's termination, the two remaining board
members, Jaffe and Edwards filed a state court action to obtain judicial
supervision to wind up the affairs of Wavelength.121 The Bankruptcy Court
issued a temporary restraining order and removed Jaffe as a director on the
board, relinquishing him of his powers as a director. 12 2 Despite his lack of
authority, Jaffe filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition on behalf of
Wavelength, which eventually turned into an adversary proceeding against
12 3
Jaffe, Edwards, and Kronfeld and the newly appointed director Tevrizian.
Upon further consideration, the court decided that the voluntary
petition filed by Jaffe would be considered an involuntary petition since Jaffe
did not have the legal authority to file on behalf of Wavelength.124
Wavelength and Kronfeld issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and
submitted a declaration for attorney's fees and punitive damages pursuant to
§ 303(i). 12 5 The Ninth Circuit Court held that, in determining bad faith under
the objective test, both Jaffe and Edwards filed their petition in bad faith and
subsequently awarded attorney's fees and damages. 126 Namely, the Court
pointed out that Jaffe's filing without sufficient authority as a director, the
subsequent signing of bankruptcy documents following the petition, coupled
with Jaffe's intent to file a bankruptcy petition without putting the Court on

See 61 B.R. 614, 622 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (finding objective test appropriate for
11
measuring bad faith in filing).
"1 See id. at 616 (detailing composition of board).
119 See id. (acknowledging change in president).
120 See id. (outlining removal of Kronfeld).
121 See In re Wavelength, 61 B.R. at 616-17 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (noting complaint to
remove director).
122 See id. at 617.

123 See id. (noting unethical actions purported by Jaffe and Edwards). The court also
mentioned "that Jaffe and Edwards filed the Chapter 11 petition 'with the sole intent of pressuring
Kronfeld into withdrawing from Debtor's business and selling his interest in Debtor to Jaffe and/or
Edwards'; and that at the time Jaffe and Edwards filed the Chapter 11 petition, Wavelength was
not insolvent." Id at 618.
124 See In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 617 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (outlining facts).
125 See id. at 617-18 (noting conduct and subsequent measures taken by Court).
126 See id. at 621-22 (explaining reasoning for affirming attorneys' fees).
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notice, amounted to bad faith. 127 The Court implicitly held that a reasonable
person, given the circumstances, would not have filed the bankruptcy
petition in this situation. 128
The objective test ultimately fails to show an accurate representation
as to whether or not bad faith exists in the creditor's decision to file an
involuntary petition because it is predicated on the whether a "reasonable
person" can actually stand in the shoes of the creditor. 129 It is dubious to
expect a reasonable person to gauge the hardships associated with a creditor
collecting debt and to comprehend the time involved in adjudicating such
matters. 3 o To weigh this seemingly abstract concept against the weighing
of the debtor's ability to pay their debts as they become due is the reason
why this test falls short of depicting creditor's bad faith.131
D. Totality of the Circumstances Test
Finally, the totality of the circumstances test involves inquiries into
both the subjective and objective standards of bad faith, by combining
several of the factors considered in the three preceding tests. 13 2 In the case
noted at the inception of this Article, In re Forever Green Athletic Fields,
the Court found, under the totality of the circumstances test, that the
127 See id. at 617-19 (outlining Jaffe and Edward's bad faith under objective test).
128 See In re Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. 614, 620 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (acknowledging
objective test is appropriate for determining bad faith). The Wavelength Court did not explicitly
hold that the objective test was the proper test as a matter of law. Id. at 620.
129 See id. (noting bad faith is a question of fact measured by reasonable person standard).
130 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing
application of bad faith tests).
131 See Lee, supra note 54, at 13-270 (noting objective test's weaknesses).
132 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing
details of totality of circumstances test and relation to other tests employed). As the court noted:
In conducting this fact-intensive review, courts may consider a number of factors,
including, but not limited to, whether: the creditors satisfied the statutory criteria for
filing the petition; the involuntary petition was meritorious; the creditors made a
reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law before filing; there was
evidence of preferential payments to certain creditors or of dissipation of the debtor's
assets; the filing was motivated by ill will or a desire to harass; the petitioning creditors
used the filing to obtain a disproportionate advantage for themselves rather than to

protect against other creditors doing the same; the filing was used as a tactical advantage
in pending actions; the filing was used as a substitute for customary debt-collection
procedures; and the filing had suspicious timing.
Id. at 336. See also In re Diamondhead Casino Corp., No. 15-11647(LSS), 2016 WL 3284674, at
*16 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (noting totality of circumstances test comprised of factors from other
bad faith tests).
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petitioning creditors were found to have acted in bad faith and imposed harsh
sanctions and a new rule stipulating that a petition can be dismissed for bad
faith on its face."' This case began with a series of lawsuits between Keith
Day, founder of Forever Green Athletic Fields, and Charles and Kelli
Dawson, owners of Pro Green. 13 4 Forever Green initiated a suit against the
Dawsons for diversion of corporate assets when the Dawsons worked for
Forever Green.1 5 Pro Green responded, and ultimately succeeded on their
action against Forever Green for unpaid commission and wages.136
After receiving their judgment, the Dawsons took action to ensure
that they would receive their payment on the judgment in a timely manner.137
First, the Dawsons attempted to terminate the arbitration process to force
Forever Green into payment.138 At the advice of counsel, they threatened to
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Forever Green to force the
money out of their pockets.139 Upon the Third Circuit's review, the Court
held that the Dawsons (Pro Green) had filed their petition in bad faith, noting
that their intentions in filing were antithetical to the purpose of
bankruptcy. 140 In conducting their analysis, the Court employed a totality of
the circumstances test, identifying both subjective and objective factors that
attributed to the bad faith filing.141
Notably, the Court examined the Dawsons' subjective intent in filing
the petition, and utilized the objective measure of determining whether or
not they examined and researched the situation prior to filing.142 The Court
also investigated the Dawson's motivation to harass Forever Green and
whether or not the petition was being used to obtain a tactical advantage. 143

133 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding
involuntary bankruptcy dismissed for bad faith).
134 See id. at 330-31 (noting series of lawsuits filed between adversaries).
13
See id. at 330 (explaining potential liability if damages awarded).
136 See id. at 331 (stating judgment exceeds $300,000).
137 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting
Dawsons' intent to obtain monies from judgment by any means). "With the consent judgment in
hand, [Charles Dawson] intended to '[fjind any available asset that Forever Green may have and
try to use the lien to seize it.' . . . [Dawson testified] 'I'm going to use that judgment to levy any
monies I can find anywhere, whether it be the arbitrator or anyone else."' Id. at 331.
138 See id. at 336 (noting hasty attempts to derail Forever Green's arbitration process).
139 See id. at 331-34 (explaining facts). "Justifying this decision, Charles Dawson said that his
counsel 'suggested the best way to get to [Forever Green's] assets would be involuntary
bankruptcy."' Id. at 331.
140 See id. at 335-36. (explaining court's holding).
141 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (adopting
totality of circumstances approach for identifying bad faith).
142 See id. at 336 (reviewing considerations for determining bad faith).
14 See id. (analyzing intent and prospective motive for filing).
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Overall, the multi-faceted analysis portrayed in the case delineated several
of the objective and subjective factors that were examined in several of the
other tests.'" This fluid analysis is the type of inspection the bankruptcy
courts should be utilizing to accurately identify bad faith.'4 5 The Forever
Green court could have ended their analysis after finding the underlying
motives behind the Dawson's intent to file a bankruptcy petition, but they
instead chose to apply a holistic review of the situation, which shed light on
the objective factors that could have made or disturbed their conclusion.1 4 6
The universal process of identifying multiple factors to attribute to bad faith
findings assists other courts in avoiding harmful error. 147
With varying standards used to assign sanctions for improperly filed
involuntary bankruptcy petitions, the Bankruptcy Courts' bifurcated
decisions and interpretations of § 303(i) leave open the question of which
standard should be applied. 148 In the process of accurately evaluating the
potential for misconduct on behalf of the creditor, courts should employ a
process that is both flexible and achievable in order to satisfy the interests of
both parties in order to prevent improperly imposed sanctions. 149 Ultimately,
the totality of the circumstances test should be adopted because it brings
together subjective and objective factors for an evaluation that adequately
identifies bad faith and serves the interests of both the debtor and the
creditor.

10

'"
See id at 336-37 (outlining factors used in determining bad faith coupled with creditor's
specific acts of bad faith).
145 See id. at 336 (noting totality of circumstances test most suitable for finding bad faith).
"This standard is most suitable for evaluating the myriad of ways in which creditors filing an
involuntary petition could act in bad faith. It also is the same standard we apply when reviewing
allegations that a debtor filed a voluntary petition in bad faith." Id.
146 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2015) (utilizing
both subjective and objective factors to determine actions constituted bad faith).
147 See id at 336 (prioritizing totality of circumstances test best for identifying bad faith). "In

conducting this fact intensive review, courts may consider a number of factors, including ...
reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law before filing; . .. evidence of
preferential payments ..... Id.
148 See Rudy, supra note 59 at 710. (explaining application of bad faith tests is left open to
courts). "Congress did not define what constitutes bad faith; consequently, bankruptcy and circuit
'courts have developed different tests to determine' what equates to bad faith." Id (citations
omitted).
149 See In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 408 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (highlighting
legislative history regarding § 303 promotes flexible approach). "Congress intended the test to be
applied with flexibility so as not to limit or restrict the involuntary process." Id.
`s See In re Smith, 243 B.R. 169, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999) (noting flexible test required to
determine whether debtor properly paying debts); see also In re Molen Drilling Co., Inc., 68 B.R.
840, 846 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (clarifying totality of circumstances test appropriate measure of
determining bad faith under § 303(i)); In re Grecian Heights Owners' Ass'n, 27 B.R. 172, 173
(Bankr. D. Or. 1982) (exclaiming purely subjective test does not aide in determination of bad faith).
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VI. INHERENT RISKS INVOLVED IN FILING INVOLUNTARY
BANKRUPTCY
While the totality of the circumstances test is the dominant means of
discovering bad faith, creditors and attorneys should be aware of the
potential consequences involved in filing an involuntary petition against a
debtor."' Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i), petitioning creditors and their attorneys
may subject themselves to costs, attorney's fees, damages proximately
caused by the petition, and punitive damages if a court finds that they filed
an involuntary petition in bad faith.152 Furthermore, after the 2015 ruling in
In Re Forever Green Athletic Fields, bankruptcy attorneys practicing and
filing petitions in the Third Circuit will face greater hurdles than those in any
other jurisdiction.' 53
Considering the harsh consequences that may
accompany the involuntary filing, litigators should be on alert and weigh the
costs and benefits of filing on behalf of a creditor. 154

"Under a purely subjective test the court herein would be unable to find that [the petitioning
creditor] acted in bad faith." Id.
151 See Blum, supra note 69, at 208 (outlining danger of involuntary bankruptcy). A court can
award costs and attorney's fees if the petition is dismissed, unless dismissal is granted under the
consent of all of the creditors to the case. Id
152 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2018) (outlining sanctions against creditors if court finds
involuntary petition filed in bad faith); see also 1-8 Lender Liability Law and Litigation § 8.08
(2017) (noting risks associated with filing bad faith petition). "Few courts have awarded costs and
attorney fees without a showing of bad faith. Thus, a debtor seeking to recover against petitioning
creditors must, for all practical purposes, show the extraordinary or excessive nature of its costs,
fees, or damages." Id.; Diane Davis, Bad Faith Dooms Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.bna.com/bad-faith-dooms-n57982062791/
(explaining harsh consequences of filing involuntary bankruptcy following Forever Green case);
Barry M. Klayman, Third CircuitAffirms Bad FaithInvoluntary Bankruptcy Dismissal, Increasing
Risk of Punitive Damages, COZEN O'CONNOR (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.cozen.com/newsresources/publications/2015/3rd-circuit-affirms-bad-faith-involuntary-bankruptcy-dismissalincreasing-risk-of-punitive-damages (noting potential risk of punitive damages accompanying
Third Circuit ruling).
153 See In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 328 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding
involuntary petition dismissible for bad faith despite meeting relief requirements).
154 See Bow, supra note 10, at 53 (outlining risks of filing involuntary bankruptcy on behalf
of creditors). "If the bankruptcy court finds that the involuntary petition was motivated by or is a
product of bad faith, in addition to attorney's fees and costs, it may award-against any petitioner-damages proximately caused by such filings along with any punitive damages due to the debtor."
Id "Even if the potentially enormous sanctions do not deter a petitioning creditor, they should be
aware that a sanction levied by a bankruptcy court for an involuntary petition in bad faith may be
held nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) if the petitioning creditor seeks to simply
discharge the fine by subsequently filing its own bankruptcy." Id.
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Petitioning creditors forcing debtors into bankruptcy also face a
multitude risks."' As an initial matter, the easiest way for a creditor to avoid
sanctions is to comply with the statutory requirements of § 303 in petitioning
for an adequate amount of debt and ensuring that there is no dispute as to the
liability owed to the creditor.15 6 Furthermore, creditors and their attorneys
should look past the standing requirements of § 303 and engage in intensive
fact finding to determine whether their involuntary bankruptcy is not
usurping other creditors' collection attempts or other proceedings relevant to
the debt, otherwise both the creditor and the attorney can be subjected to
penalties and sanctions."' In the end, depending on which circuit the
creditor files an involuntary petition in, it may not be worth the cost of the
litigation and the potential for other fees that may be imposed."'
Involuntary bankruptcy was once a widely accepted and utilized tool
for creditors to collect on obligations. With reform and measures to protect
debtors that opportunity has now been diminished, forcing creditors to either
attempt to perfect their interest or wait until the debtor voluntarily enters
bankruptcy and limit their opportunity to collect. Now, creditors risk more
than their unsecured interest in attempting to file bankruptcy. The divide
among the circuit courts has only made matters worse for creditorspotentially supporting findings of bad faith without proper consideration of
See Stickles & Reilley, supra note 55, at 31 (noting recovery of expenses and attorney's
fees in involuntary bankruptcy); see also Barry Klayman, A Cautionary Tale For Involuntary
Bankruptcy Petitioners, LAw360 (Oct. 26, 2015) http://www.law360.com/articles/718749/acautionary-tale-for-involuntary-bankruptcy-petitioners (describing harsh consequences following
Forever Green, including sanctions and fees); Thomas Piney, Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitions
29,
2015),
LLP
(Oct.
&
WILLIAMS
Caution,
WHITE
Use
With
http://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Involuntary-Bankruptcy-Petitions-Use-WithCaution.html (outlining risks and consequences of filing involuntary petition).
156 See Rudy, supra note 59, at 709-11 (noting varying requirements for petitioning creditors
under § 303).
157 See 1-8 Lender Liability Law and Litigation § 8.08 (2017) (noting counsel's liability in
assisting petitioning creditor in filing involuntary bankruptcy). "In addition to potential penalties
and sanctions against a client under Section 303(i), counsel who assist in the filing of an involuntary
petition ... may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and
attorney's fees . . . ." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927). The statutory language of §303(i) supports the
proposition that attorney's fees should be assessed against petitioning creditors jointly and severally
and that awards of damages for bad faith may lead to joint and several liability. Id; see also Bow,
supra note 10, at 53 (emphasizing creditor and attorney jointly liable if found filed petition in bad
faith).
1
See Block-Lieb, supranote 43, at 844-46 (noting preferences for non-judicial resolutions).
"Creditors may prefer not to pursue their coercive collection remedies because they stand to gain
little from litigation with the debtor." Id. "Moreover, creditors of an individual debtor rarely have
anything to gain from the commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case because the filing of
a petition is a particularly ineffective means of coercing repayment of an individual debtor's
obligations." Id. at 846.
-
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the creditor's situation. While the courts will continue to utilize their
individual tests for determining bad faith without guidance from Congress,
the totality of the circumstances test should be adopted universally to protect
both the interests of debtors and creditors.
Nevertheless, creditors and their attorneys should be wary of the
potential consequences that may arise with filing for involuntary bankruptcy.
Without taking the appropriate steps to ensure that all other collection routes
have been utilized and that they fully meet the requirements under § 303,
creditors will find themselves subjected to harsh penalties and sanctions for
their collection efforts if found to be improperly accorded with the rules in
the bankruptcy code.
Carlos Wilder

